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Illegally Seized Evidence at Sentencing: How
to Satisfy the Constitution and the Guidelines with an "Evidentiary"Limitation
Clinton R. Pinyant

The exclusionary rule provides that the government may not
use evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
against the victim of the seizure.1 The exclusionary rule, however, does not completely prohibit the use of such evidence in
court.2 Instead, it applies only when exclusion is likely to deter
law enforcement officers from engaging in similar illegal searches, and when the value of this deterrence justifies the costs of
exclusion to the proceeding's accuracy. 3
For years courts have considered whether the exclusionary
rule applies at sentencing. Sentencing traditionally has been free
from the evidentiary rules of trial,4 and federal courts have recognized that sentencing judges historically had discretion to consider illegally seized evidence.5 These courts have held that the
exclusionary rule applies at sentencing only where searches are
most easily deterrable: some courts have excluded the evidence
where its admission would provide a "substantial incentive" for
illegal searches,6 while others have done so where the government has seized the evidence "for the express purpose" of increasing the sentence.7 Most courts have favored the latter "purpose"
limitation, which focuses on the subjective intent of the officers.

t B.A. 1991, Wake Forest University; J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Chicago.
See Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 398 (1914), overruled on other grounds,
Elkins v United States, 364 US 206 (1960). "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated." US Const, Amend IV.
2 See United States v Calandra,414 US 338, 348 (1974) ("Despite its broad deterrent
purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.").
See id.
See Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 246 (1949).
See, for example, United States v McCrory, 930 F2d 63, 71 (DC Cir 1991)
(Silberman concurring).
6 See Verdugo v United States, 402 F2d 599, 613 (9th Cir 1968).
See United States v Schipani, 435 F2d 26, 28 (2d Cir 1970).
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Because it is virtually impossible to demonstrate such intent,'
the exclusionary rule almost never applies at sentencing.9
The adoption of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the
"Guidelines") in 1987 vastly changed the traditional sentencing
regime.'I The Guidelines substituted a set of rules that strive to
induce uniform treatment of similar defendants for a discretionary system of sentencing that sought to individualize sentences
within a broad range.''
Some judges and commentators have argued that the Guidelines have altered the balancing test that courts perform to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies at sentencing.12
They have argued that under the Guidelines' mechanical sentencing system, which focuses on characteristics of the crime committed, such as the amount of drugs involved, police officers may
easily correlate their searches with the sentences they want imposed.13 In order to deter such deliberate searches, some observers have favored a blanket exclusion of illegally seized evidence
at sentencing. 4 Nevertheless, most courts have continued to
hold that the Guidelines reinforced, not reversed, the earlier
rejection of the exclusionary rule at sentencing. 5
This Comment argues that the majority of courts have overly
restricted the application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing.
They have failed to consider that exclusion of evidence has a
deterrent effect even in cases where the defendant cannot prove
that police officers possessed an express "purpose" to increase his
sentence. Therefore, this Comment argues that the exclusionary
rule should apply more broadly at sentencing.
Those who argue in favor of blanket exclusion at sentencing,
however, fail adequately to reconcile their beliefs with the Su-

8

See, for example, United States v Jewel, 947 F2d 224, 238 (7th Cir 1991)

(Easterbrook concurring) ("It is inconceivable that any defendant will be able to show that
the police had only one of these purposes in mind when making a seizure.").
9 See id.
10 See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Ch 1, Pt A (1993)
("USSG").
" Id.
12 See, for example, Jewel, 947 F2d at 239-40 (Easterbrook concurring); McCrory, 930
F2d at 71 (Silberman concurring).
13 McCrory, 930 F2d at 71 (Silberman concurring).
" See Comment, Laundering Illegally Seized Evidence Through the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 59 U Chi L Rev 1209, 1233 (1992); Note, An End Run Around the
Exclusionary Rule: The Use of Illegally Seized Evidence Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev 241, 285-86 (1992).
1 See, for example, United States v Lynch, 934 F2d 1226, 1235-36 (11th Cir 1991);
McCrory, 930 F2d at 68; United States v Torres, 926 F2d 321, 324-25 (3d Cir 1991).
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preme Court's command that the exclusionary rule be narrowly
construed. While the Guidelines do tilt the balance in favor of
exclusion, they do not tip the scales so far as to require blanket
exclusion. Instead, courts should adopt a strong, objective approach to the "substantial incentive" exception to the
exclusionary rule-one which would require courts to exclude any
evidence seized after the officers have sufficient physical evidence
to secure a conviction for a related offense. This proposed exception distinguishes between deterrable and undeterrable searches
and eliminates the fruits of many egregious searches without
resorting to overbroad application of the exclusionary rule at
sentencing.
Part I of this Comment outlines the pre-Guidelines history of
the exclusionary rule at the sentencing phase. Part II explores
the changes wrought by the Guidelines. Finally, Part III concludes by examining the facts of many leading cases and the
incentive structure at work in them to demonstrate that an "evidentiary" limitation would achieve the appropriate level of deterrence of illegal searches while narrowly tailoring the exclusion.
I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE BEFORE THE GUIDELINES
Courts enforce the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures through the exclusionary
rule.16 The Supreme Court has held that the rule does not create a "personal constitutional right" to the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence 7 but applies mainly, and perhaps only, to deter

16 See Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 398 (1914), overruled on other grounds,
Elkins v United States, 364 US 206 (1960).
17 United States v Calandra,414 US 338, 348 (1974). See Illinois v Krull, 480 US
340, 347 (1987); United States v Tejada, 956 F2d 1256, 1260 (2d Cir 1991), cert denied,
113 S Ct 124 (1992) and as Cabrera v United States, 113 S Ct 334 (1992).
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illegal searches. s Courts therefore apply the rule exclusively
where the objective of deterrence is "most efficaciously served." 9
While courts originally applied the exclusionary rule only to
the case in chief against criminal defendants,2" they have subsequently employed the rule in other settings. In United States v
Calandra,2 the Supreme Court held that in determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule to a particular stage of the trial,
courts should weigh the effectiveness of achieving deterrence
against the costs of withholding reliable physical evidence from
the proceeding in question.22 Applying this balancing test, the
Court held that the rule should not apply in a grand jury proceeding."
Historically, the exclusionary rule has not played an important role in sentencing.24 A sentencing judge traditionally "could
8 See Calandra,414 US at 347. The Court in Calandranoted:

The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy
of the search victim ....
Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future
unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id (citations omitted). See also Krull, 480 US at 347.
The Court has recognized, then repudiated, two competing rationales for the
exclusionary rule. One was the need to maintain the integrity of the judiciary, see Terry v
Ohio, 392 US 1, 12-13 (1968), a rationale that the Court dramatically limited in Stone v
Powell, 428 US 465, 485 (1976). See also James v Illinois, 493 US 307, 312 n 1 (1990)
(conceding that only "Iclertain Members of the Court" held this view). For a brief discussion, see Note, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev at 247-48 (cited in note 14). Also, the Court once
alluded to a personal privacy right protected by the rule. See Weeks, 232 US at 398; Mapp
v Ohio, 367 US 643, 649 (1961). That rationale, however, would not carry today's Court.
See Calandra,414 US at 347; Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 US 365, 375-76 (1986); United
States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906 (1984).
"
Calandra,414 US at 348. See also Krull, 480 US at 347.
20 See Weeks, 232 US at 398.
21 414 US 338 (1974).
22 Id at 349.
2' Calandra,414 US at 354. The Court held that application of the exclusionary rule
would endanger the role of the grand jury in investigating criminal activity "unimpeded
by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial," id at 349,
while deterrence would be minimal because exclusion of evidence before the grand jury
that is already excluded at trial "would deter only police investigation consciously directed
toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation," id at 351.
The Court has determined the reach of the exclusionary rule by using this same balancing
test in several contexts outside the trial on the merits. See, for example, James, 493 US
at 313-14 (defining the scope of use of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment); Immi.
gration and NaturalizationService v Lopez-Mendoza, 468 US 1032, 1041-46 (1984) (declining to employ the rule in civil deportation proceedings); United States v Janis, 428 US
433, 454 (1976) (declining to employ the rule in civil tax proceedings).
24 In fact, only one pre-Guidelines circuit court, the Ninth Circuit in Verdugo v United States, 402 F2d 599 (9th Cir 1968), excluded illegally seized evidence at sentencing.
See United States v Graves, 785 F2d 870, 873 (10th Cir 1986); United States v Jewel, 947
F2d 224, 238 (7th Cir 1991) (Easterbrook concurring).
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exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence
used to assist him."25 In Williams v New York, 26 for example,
the Court held that evidence that was inadmissible at trial could
be considered at sentencing.2 7 This discretion to consider illegally seized evidence at sentencing embodied the "prevalent modern
philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." "
This leeway led appellate courts to allow sentencing judges
generally to consider illegally seized evidence. Two conflicting
exceptions to this general rule, however, emerged in Verdugo v
United States " and United States v Schipani,30
In Verdugo, the Ninth Circuit held that sentencing judges
must exclude illegally seized evidence where its use "would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and
seizures."3 1 The court accepted the prevailing rationale that the
goal of individualized sentences requires an open-ended sentencing inquiry. 2 It also recognized, however, that the exclusionary
rule's purpose of deterring illegal searches circumscribes sentencing judges' access to information." The court, in balancing these
factors, discussed two approaches to determining when the
exclusionary rule should apply.'
The first approach, which this Comment labels the "evidentiary" limitation, states that the exclusionary rule should apply
once officers have secured "sufficient evidence to convict" the
defendant.3 5 This limitation would deter future illegal searches
because if the exclusionary rule does not apply in such a case,
officers have no incentive to refrain from subsequent unlawful
searches:

26

Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 246 (1949).
337 US 241 (1949).

27

See id at 251-52.

2'
29

Id at 247.

402 F2d 599 (9th Cir 1968).
435 F2d 26 (2d Cir 1970).
31 Verdugo, 402 F2d at 613.
32

Id at 611.

Id.
Verdugo clearly does not support a blanket application of the exclusionary rule at
sentencing. According to that court, "exclusion was required in the circumstances of
the ... case." Verdugo, 402 F2d at 611. Moreover, the Verdugo court ruled: "[Wihere, as
here, the use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures, that evidence should be disregarded by
the sentencing judge." Id at 613.
" Id at 612.
3
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Unless the evidence were unavailable for sentence as
well as conviction, the agents had nothing to lose by
risking an unlawful search: if the motion to suppress
were denied, Verdugo could be convicted of an additional offense; if it were granted, the sentence on the original charge could still be enhanced."
In other words, Verdugo suggests that the exclusionary rule
should apply at sentencing to prevent officers from seizing evidence illegally once they have some "untainted evidence" of an
offense.3 7 This limitation applied to Verdugo because officers
searched his home when they already had sufficient evidence to
arrest him.3 8
The court also articulated a subjective "purpose" rationale for
applying the exclusionary rule at sentencing. In response to the
argument that the exclusionary rule would not have deterred the
officers because they were not interested in the length of sentence, 9 the court reasoned that these officers, members of a special drug unit, may have wanted to ensure a long sentence because their unit could fight drugs effectively only by imprisoning
repeat offenders. ° The court implied that the exclusionary rule,
therefore, should apply because the officers intended to increase
Verdugo's sentence and were thus deterrable. 4"
Although the court discussed the officers' subjective motivation, it relied more heavily on the objective "evidentiary" test of
deterrability 2 Indeed, Verdugo's holding that the exclusionary
rule should apply where the use of illegally seized evidence
"would provide a substantial incentive for unconstitutional
searches"4 3 in the future is quite different from a holding that
the rule should only apply where the defense can prove that
officers in a particularcase had a substantial incentive for unconstitutional searches and purposefully acted upon it. The former

"

Id.

See Verdugo, 402 F2d at 612.
Id. The judge in Verdugo imposed a fifteen-year sentence following Verdugo's conviction for selling less than three grams of heroin. Id at 608-09. The court considered that
police had seized 371 grams of heroin from Verdugo's home when arresting him-two
months after the three-gram sale-by searching the home without a warrant for four and
one-half hours and using tactics that included dismantling electrical fixtures and punching holes in walls. Id at 609-10.
3' See Verdugo, 402 F2d at 612.
40 See id.
'7

41
42
43

See id.
See id at 613.
Verdugo, 402 F2d at 613 (emphasis added).
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determines when applying the exclusionary rule will provide
adequate deterrence, as Calandra requires, while the latter encompasses only a small and hard-to-prove subsection of those
cases.
Two years later, however, in United States v Schipani, the
Second Circuit failed to adopt, or even to recognize, Verdugo's

"evidentiary" limitation; instead, it held that only an officer's

subjective intent to increase the accused's sentence would justify
exclusion of illegally seized evidence at sentencing." The
Schipani court ruled: "Where illegally seized evidence is reliable
and it is clear, as here, that it was not gathered for the express
purpose of improperly influencing the sentencing judge, there is
no error in using it in connection with fixing sentence."45 In a
precursor to the Calandra balancing test, the Schipani court46
recognized the great need for information in crafting sentences
and noted the minimal countervailing deterrent potential of applying the exclusionary rule at sentencing.47 Significantly, the
Schipani court regarded Verdugo as resting more on the officers'
intent than on objective criteria.4 s
In United States v Vandemark,4 9 the Ninth Circuit itself
further weakened Verdugo's "evidentiary" limitation. In finding
the search at issue undeterrable, ° the court distinguished
Vandemark from Verdugo on three grounds. First, it stated that
the Verdugo search was "blatantly illegal," in contrast to an
unintrusive search of Vandemark's car.5 1 Second, Vandemark
accepted Verdugo's "purpose" language and stated that the offi-

See United States v Schipani, 435 F2d 26, 28 (2d Cir 1970).
4' Id (emphasis added).

Id at 27. See also Williams, 337 US at 247.
7 "[Aipplying the exclusionary rule for a second time at sentencing after having already applied it once at the trial itself would not add in any significant way to the deterrent effect of the rule." Schipani, 435 F2d at 28.
" The Schipani court mischaracterized Verdugo as holding that the exclusionary rule
applied "where evidence was illegally seized to enhance the possibility of a heavier sentence." Id at 28 n 1.
'9 522 F2d 1019 (9th Cir 1975).
'o The trial court convicted Vandemark of possession of twenty-eight pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute and sentenced him to probation for two years. Three weeks
later, Border Patrol agents found 284 pounds of marijuana in Vandemark's trunk during
a routine search. The government declined to prosecute Vandemark for the second offense
after he protested that the search was unfounded, but, nonetheless, it used the customs
evidence to have a judge revoke Vandemark's probation and impose a two-year sentence
for the first crime. Id at 1020.
" Id at 1023. Although the Vandemark court properly distinguished the facts on this
ground, the degree of illegality does not appear to have served as a part of Verdugo's holding. See Verdugo, 402 F2d at 613.
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cers here had no desire to increase Vandemark's sentence.52
Third, the court recognized the reasoning of Verdugo's "evidentiary" limitation, but it distinguished this case because the officers
did not know Vandemark had already been convicted of another
crime; therefore, they had no incentive to search for evidence to
enhance his initial sentence.53
By drawing these distinctions, the Vandemark court
mischaracterized Verdugo as resting on all three of these
grounds. By mentioning the search's intrusiveness and the
officers' purpose as bases of the Verdugo holding, Vandemark
allowed later courts to cite Verdugo but claim that it stands for
the Schipani "purpose" test.5 4 The Ninth Circuit's failure to elucidate and reinforce Verdugo's "evidentiary" exception led to its
virtual disappearance from exclusionary rule jurisprudence.55

II. THE GUIDELINES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A.

The Guidelines

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act")" reflected
growing dissatisfaction with discretionary sentencing. Citing the
"unjustifiably wide range of sentences [given] to offenders with
similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed under
similar circumstances,"5 7 Congress authorized the United States
Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") to promulgate the
Guidelines, a set of specific formulas and factors to control sentencing decisions.5" The formulas, effective as of 1987,"9 serve
Congress's goal of uniformity by requiring judges to sentence

"2 Vandemark, 522 F2d at 1023-24.
53

Id.

See Comment, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1213 (cited in note 14).
Some circuits, particularly in older cases, accepted Verdugo as standing for an
"evidentiary" limitation. See United States v Lee, 540 F2d 1205, 1212 (4th Cir 1976);
Graves, 785 F2d at 873-74. The overwhelming majority of post-Guidelines courts, however, have destroyed any distinction between Verdugo and Schipani by finding that Verdugo
established a "purpose" exception. See United States v Torres, 926 F2d 321, 325 (3d Cir
1991); United States v McCrory, 930 F2d 63, 69 (DC Cir 1991); United States v Lynch, 934
F2d 1226, 1237 n 15 (11th Cir 1991); United States v Montoya.Ortiz, 7 F3d 1171, 1181 n
10 (5th Cir 1993).
" Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified at 18 USC
§ 3551 et seq (1984).
" Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 2d Sess
38-39 (1984).
' See 28 USC § 994(a) (1988); USSG Ch 1, Pt A (cited in note 10).
'9 See USSG Ch 1, Pt A (cited in note 10).
"
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from a table that determines a narrow basic sentencing range,
the "base offense level," based on the type and gravity of the
crime.6 ° For drug offenses, the base offense level is fixed by the
amount and type of drug involved.6
Although the Act authorized a seemingly strict and mathematical set of Guidelines, Congress voiced its continuing acceptance of the Williams doctrine by maintaining and recodifying
Title 18, Section 3661 of the United States Code ("Section
3661").2 This Section provides that a federal court must not be
limited in the information it may consider in sentencing. ' Section 1B1.4 of the Guidelines reiterates this policy."
While it may seem strange to couple a narrow set of inquiries with broad access to information, the Guidelines manifest
both Congress's and the Commission's desire to promote inquiry
into relevant conduct not specified in the Guidelines' tables. The
base offense level must take into account "relevant conduct" other
than the crime of conviction. 5 "Relevant conduct" in drug offenses includes "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by
the defendant" 6 that are "part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." 6' There-

fore, evidence of acts that are "substantially connected by at least

60 Id.

See, for example, id at § 2D1.1.
62 Even though "no discussion of the continued need for the section appear[ed] in ei-

ther the congressional debate or the text of the statute," Note, 34 Wm and Mary L Rev at
262 (cited in note 14), Section 3661 is still law.
' "No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 USC §
3661 (1988) (formerly 18 USC § 3577 (1972)). The House drafters indicated that Williams
formed the statute's basis. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, HR Rep No 91-1549,
91st Cong, 2d Sess 63 (1970). See also United States v Grayson, 438 US 41, 50 n 10 (1978)
(acknowledging the statute's heritage).
USSG § 1B1.4 (cited in note 10). The Commission copied the language in USSG §
1B1.4 from Section 3661. See id at § 1B1.4, comment (background). "The recodification of
this 1970 statute in 1984 with an effective date of 1987, makes it clear that Congress
intended that no limitation would be placed on the information that a court may consider
in imposing an appropriate sentence under the future guideline sentencing system." Id
(citation omitted).
5 "[Tlhe base offense level ... shall be determined on the basis of" certain relevant
conduct. Id at § 1B1.3 ("Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guidelines
Range)").
' USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (cited in note 10). See also id at § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (requiring
courts to include all actions taken by joint venturers "in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity").
6? Id at § 1B1.3(a)(2) (subsection applying to drug offenses).
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one common factor" are considered under the relevant conduct
provision. 8 In addition to relevant conduct, other acts may enter the sentencing decision either (1) as a basis for departure
from the base level to a higher or lower range, 9 or (2) in fixing
a term within the base offense level range. The Guidelines thus
walk a tightrope between a new proclivity toward mechanical
uniformity in sentencing and the old sentiment that in order to
mete out fair sentences, courts must consider information not
easily quantifiable.
B.

Post-Guidelines Cases on the Exclusionary Rule

Neither the Act, its legislative history, nor the Guidelines
explicitly mention the proper treatment of illegally seized evidence under the Guidelines.70 Although most courts have declared that the exclusionary rule still does not apply at sentencing, some support has grown for the position that the Guidelines
require restrictions on the use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing.
1. The majority rule: continued admissibility at sentencing.
After the Guidelines, most courts have emphasized the continuity between pre- and post-Guidelines treatment of illegally
seized evidence at sentencing.7 They have found that the
Guidelines continued, or even accentuated, the pre-Guidelines
logic that illegally seized evidence should be considered.72 Three
cases, United States v Torres,7 United States v McCrory, 4 and

" See USSG § 1B1.3, comment (n 9(A)) (cited in note 10). These common factors include "common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operan.

di." Id.
9 If judges departed regularly on the basis of these marginally connected acts, then
ad hoc discretion would reign anew; however, a judge may depart from the Guidelines
only when he finds that the Guidelines have not "adequately taken into consideration" an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance. 18 USC § 3553(b) (1988). Furthermore, Congress
expects judges to depart when necessary. S Rep No 98-225 at 52 (cited in note 57). The
Senate Report states: "The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure
for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender,
not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences." Id. See USSG §
1B1.4, comment (background) (cited in note 10).
'0 See Cheryl G. Bader and David S. Douglas, Where to Draw the Guideline: Factoring the Fruits of Illegal Searches into Sentencing Guidelines Calculations, 7 Touro L Rev
1, 32 (1990).
"' See, for example, United States v Torres, 926 F2d 321, 324 (3d Cir 1991) ("The
Sentencing Guidelines preserve the liberality granted the sentencing judge.").
72

See id.

"3 In Torres, the court held that, under the Guidelines, a sentencing judge could con-

5231

ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE

United States v Lynch,75 typify the standard post-Guidelines
understanding that the exclusionary rule will apply at sentencing
perhaps only when evidence is seized for the "purpose" of enhancing the defendant's sentence. The existence of even this narrow
"purpose" limitation, however, is unsettled.
These decisions typically have held that the Williams doctrine of affording "traditional liberality" to sentencing courts"
still applies in the post-Guidelines world." They have cited several congressional and Guidelines provisions in support of this
position: (1) Section 3661's codification of Williams; (2) Guidelines Section 1B1.4's reiteration of Section 3661;"9 (3) the "relevant conduct" provision, which requires the court "to consider, to
some degree, the actual conduct of the offense";' and (4) Guidelines Section 6A1.3, which provides that the court may consider
relevant but inadmissible information in resolving disputes about
sentencing factors. 1 Most courts have read these provisions as
placing congressional imprimatur on wide-ranging judicial discretion in sentencing despite the Guidelines' overall mechanical
structure. 2
These courts have implicitly believed that the Guidelines do
not create additional incentives for illegal searches." Indeed,
some of these courts have not even recognized that the
exclusionary rule should apply to searches for the "purpose" of
increasing a sentence,' implying that they might further resider a kilogram of cocaine found following a warrantless search of an automobile outside
an apartment targeted by the DEA, even though the judge suppressed the evidence at
trial. Id at 322.
' The MeCrory court held that the prosecution could introduce evidence of a kilogram and a half of crack seized when officers reentered an apartment to search it after
they had seen stashes of crack in the apartment during a warrantless prior drug purchase
and arrest. United States v McCrory, 930 F2d 63, 69 (DC Cir 1991).
" In Lynch, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a lower court decision to include in the
sentencing decision guns seized in plain view when officers arrested Lynch without a warrant. United States v Lynch, 934 F2d 1226, 1228 (11th Cir 1991).
76 Id at 1235.

See, for example, McCrory, 930 F2d at 68.
Torres, 926 F2d at 324; McCrory, 930 F2d at 68; Lynch, 934 F2d at 1235-36.
7' McCrory, 930 F2d at 68; Lynch, 934 F2d at 1236.
Torres, 926 F2d at 324. See McCrory, 930 F2d at 65.
81 Torres, 926 F2d at 324; Lynch, 934 F2d at 1236.
82 "[E]xcluding all illegally seized evidence would frustrate the federal policy, codified,
"

'

in part, in the Act and the Sentencing Guidelines, that judges consider all relevant and
reliable facts in order to assure that each defendant receives an individualized sentence."
Lynch, 934 F2d at 1236.
See Torres, 926 F2d at 325; McCrory, 930 F2d at 68-69.
Some courts have explicitly refused to reach the issue. See Torres, 926 F2d at 325;
McCrory, 930 F2d at 69. But see United States v Montoya-Ortiz, 7 F3d 1171, 1181 n 10
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strict the exclusionary rule's role in sentencing beyond even the
Schipani test. Because these courts have believed that the Guidelines changed neither side of the Calandra equation-the value
of open consideration of all relevant evidence compared to the
ability to deter illegal searches-they
have found no reason to
5
change the outcome of that test.

2. Attempts to apply the exclusionary rule at sentencing.
The voices supporting application of the exclusionary rule at
sentencing are faint but growing louder. They currently include
one Sixth Circuit decision, which the circuit quickly repudiated,
and two concurrences by circuit judges.
6
In 1992, the Sixth Circuit decided United States v Nichols,"
in which the sentencing judge relied on evidence that officers had
seized illegally while investigating prior drug offenses. 7 On review, the circuit court held that the exclusionary rule bars the introduction of evidence at sentencing that was illegally seized
during an investigation or arrest for the crime of conviction."
(5th Cir 1993) (accepting a "purpose" limitation). Furthermore, at least one court is openly
skeptical of the idea that officers would intentionally search solely to increase a sentence.
Lynch, 934 F2d at 1236 n 14.
' The Second Circuit in Tejada went one step beyond Torres, McCrory, and Lynch by
holding not only that the Guidelines allow admission of illegally seized evidence, but also
that the Guidelines now require that, absent a showing of the officers' "purpose" to enhance a sentence, a district court must consider relevant illegally seized evidence. United
States v Tejada, 956 F2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir 1991), cert denied, 113 S Ct 124 (1992) and
as Cabrerav United States, 113 S Ct 334 (1992). The court read the Guidelines as removing the sentencing judge's discretion to disregard evidence of relevant conduct. Id. Finding
that the Guidelines' goal of uniformity prevents judges from engaging in "ad hoc determinations [that] would create disparities in sentences in the absence of differences in conduct," the Tejada court held that such discretion in the face of the Guidelines' system
"would sidestep Congress and violate Separation of Powers principles." Id.
The court cited Lynch, Torres, and McCrory as supporting the notion that sentencing
judges "should" consider illegally seized evidence. Id. While this reading of these cases
may be correct, it is not clearly correct because at least two of the cases employ language
plainly indicating that consideration of the evidence is not mandatory. See Torres, 926
F2d at 325; McCrory, 930 F2d at 68. The Tejada court's reasoning, however, is supported
by the absolute language of the relevant conduct provision, which permits no discretion in
ordering that judges "shall" determine the base offense level by considering all acts in
"the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan," even if these acts are demonstrated by illegally seized evidence. USSG § 1B1.3 (cited in note 10). See also id at § 1B3,
comment (describing application of the relevant conduct provision). Furthermore, mandatory consideration of evidence that passes constitutional muster furthers the purpose of
the Guidelines to bring predictability and uniformity to sentencing decisions. See id at Ch
1, Pt A.
979 F2d 402 (6th Cir 1992), afl'd on other grounds, 114 S Ct 1921 (1994).
Id at 405. The sentencing judge relied on this earlier illegally seized evidence
merely to fix the defendant within the base offense range. Id at 408.
8'Id at 410-11.
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The court reassessed the Calandra balancing test under the
"momentous changes" wrought by the rigid, predictable Guidelines system. 9 In the arbitrary pre-Guidelines world, the court
stated, officers could never be sure that the judge would sentence
more harshly based upon evidence admitted solely at sentencing,
and thus officers "had little incentive to seize evidence illegally
and thereby forfeit its use at trial."9° Under the Guidelines,
however, the court concluded that officers could secure a conviction on a minor offense supported by legally seized evidence and
then create a much higher sentence through an illegal search
geared toward sentencing."
The Nichols rule was very short-lived, if it indeed ever
amounted to anything but dicta.92 In Nichols itself, the court3
declined to apply the exclusionary rule on the facts before it,

and nine months later in United States v Jenkins,94 the circuit
dismissed the Nichols rule as mere dicta and adopted the majority position.95
Nichols followed the logic of two previous concurrences that
had expressed concern about the continued post-Guidelines rejection of the exclusionary rule at sentencing. Judge Silberman,
concurring in McCrory, stated, as the Nichols court would later
"' Nichols, 979 F2d at 411.
90 Id.

"' "[S]tate officers now have the somewhat perverse incentive to rely more heavily on
sentencing than trial to establish facts that may be of overriding importance in determining a defendant's length of imprisonment-for example, the total amount of drugs involved in a criminal scheme." Id.
' Notably, Judge Nelson refused to join the court's pronouncement on the
exclusionary rule, calling it "dicta." Id at 418 (Nelson concurring in the judgment).
' The court proffered two reasons for not applying the exclusionary rule. First, officers seized the evidence at issue during an arrest two years earlier on unrelated charges.
Nichols, 979 F2d at 405. Therefore, to deter the police from making the search, the court
would have had to infer that "absent the [exclusionary] rule, police would have an incentive to seize evidence illegally solely on the expectation that the evidence might be used in
sentencing the defendant for a subsequent crime." Id at 412 (emphasis in original). The
court concluded that "such an inference is simply too frail to support application of the
exclusionary rule in this instance." Id. Second, the Nichols court concluded that courts
could consider illegally seized evidence if deciding merely where to sentence a defendant
within the base offense range, as the sentencing court had done here. Id. In clear contradiction of its broad and bold application of the exclusionary rule, the court concluded its
discussion of the issue by stating: "[Wihere evidence is illegally seized in relation to conduct that does not fall within the relevant conduct provisions of the sentencing guidelines,
and the district court does not otherwise rely on the evidence in determining the
defendant's sentence, the court may consider such evidence in determining where to sentence the defendant within the recommended guideline range." Nichols, 979 F2d at 412.
4 F3d 1338 (6th Cir 1993), cert. denied, 114 S Ct 1547 (1994).
'5 The rule in Nichols was just "two members of this court expressting their view] in
dicta." Id at 1345 n 8.
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state, that under the Guidelines, a shift in incentives occurs

when the officers obtain enough evidence to convict the defendant
on a lesser charge.96 Once that initial evidence is gathered, officers know that regardless of whether any additional evidence
they seize is legally obtained, it will effectively count against the
defendant: it will serve as either evidence of an additional crime

or of "relevant conduct" which increases the length of the sen-

tence for the initial crime. 7 The result is that "there is nothing
to deter them from seizing the evidence immediately without obtaining a warrant."" Judge Silberman concluded: "I doubt
whether we will ever see a stronger case for application of the
exclusionary rule to the sentencing proceedings than here, where
the break-in occurred after the police had already obtained sufficient evidence to convict the defendant."99

In focusing on the amount of evidence already obtained by
the officers, Judge Silberman hinted at the "evidentiary" distinction that had disappeared since Verdugo. Moreover, he expressed
dissatisfaction with the "purpose" inquiry into whether the officers subjectively obtained the evidence for sentencing. o Judge
Silberman, however, merely recognized the nature of the incentive structure and did not specifically endorse the Verdugo "evidentiary" limitation.0 1
In United States v Jewel,"2 Judge Easterbrook suggested
that the exclusionary rule should apply uniformly at sentencing.'03 He agreed with Judge Silberman's criticism of the "pur-

pose" limitation on the exclusionary rule

4

and instead asserted

McCrory, 930 F2d at 71 (Silberman concurring). Judge Silberman contrasted
McCrory with Torres because in Torres, the officers had seized all the evidence in the
same warrantless search; therefore, there was no independent search geared only to increase the sentence. "The police could not have known before the search that they had
sufficient evidence to convict, and the possibility of suppression of the seized evidence at
trial would thus have constituted deterrence enough." Id at 71 n 2 (Silberman concurring).
"7 Id at 71 (Silberman concurring).
'8 Id.
02 McCrory, 930 F2d at 72 (Silberman concurring) (emphasis added).
"0
Judge Silberman saw the "purpose" test as hard to prove and as ineffective deterrence. See id.
"10Judge Silberman declined to dissent because he anticipated that the Supreme
Court would agree with his panel. Id.
102 947 F2d 224 (7th Cir 1991).
" See id at 240 (Easterbrook concurring). Although the court did not need to resolve
the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applied at sentencing, id at 232 n 11, Judge
Easterbrook addressed the issue in depth.
" See Jewel, 947 F2d at 238 (Easterbrook concurring). Judge Easterbrook maintained
the test is impractical because police will never have just one motive. Moreover, the test
is illogical because the purpose behind a seizure does not determine its offensiveness. See
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that an "objective" standard was more appropriate: the
exclusionary rule should categorically apply or not apply to entire
junctures of a proceeding.1 5
Like the Nichols court and Judge Silberman in his concurrence in McCrory, Judge Easterbrook based his concurrence on
the post-Guidelines change in the Calandra balancing test. 16
Judge Easterbrook, however, went even further: his desire for a
bright-line, categorical rule led him to imply that the
exclusionary rule should always apply at the sentencing
phase. 17
III. A SOLUTION THAT CAN BOTH PUNISH OFFENDERS
AND DETER OFFICERS

Although some observers have advocated blanket application
of the exclusionary rule at sentencing,"°8 the typical court allows for blanket admission of such evidence, with a possible
stringent "purpose" exception that most defendants find impossible to meet.0 9 Neither avenue, however, leads to satisfactory
results or to an approach consistent with the purposes of both the
exclusionary rule and the Guidelines.
In order to reach a result logically consistent with the
exclusionary rule and the Guidelines, courts must answer two
different questions: (1) whether sentencing judges should ever
admit illegally seized evidence; and (2) if they do, when they
should admit it. This Comment argues that illegally seized evidence should be admissible at sentencing, subject to a strong
"evidentiary" limitation.
A.

Blanket Application of the Exclusionary Rule at Sentencing
Is Not Justified

Most courts admittedly have ignored the changes that have
occurred in the Calandra balancing test under the Guidelines
system. While the balance has shifted somewhat, it is necessary

id.

105 Id at 239 (Easterbrook concurring).

'
107

Id at 239-40 (Easterbrook concurring).
See Jewel, 947 F2d at 240 (Easterbrook concurring).

See Comment, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1211 (cited in note 14); Note, 34 Wm & Mary L
Rev at 243 (cited in note 14). See also United States v Jewel, 947 F2d 224, 240 (7th Cir
1991) (Easterbrook concurring) (suggesting application of the rule but stopping short of
endorsing it).
108

109 See, for example, United States v McCrory, 930 F2d 63, 69 (DC Cir 1991).
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to ask whether it has tilted to such an extent to justify blanket
application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing. Under
Calandra, the exclusionary rule should apply only where its
deterrent purpose is "most efficaciously served."110 Blanket application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing would not narrowly serve this purpose.
Pre-Guidelines cases clearly stated that illegally seized evidence was admissible at sentencing because it was highly relevant and helpful to the sentencing system, while the rule's deter1
rent effect would be minimal."
Therefore, the test tilted toward admission of the evidence in most, if not all, cases.112
Since adoption of the Guidelines, commentators have argued
that the Calandra test has shifted on both sides of the balance:
exclusion is now less costly to the proceeding, and the need for
deterrence is greater under the Guidelines system. Given this
alleged shift, some observers have claimed that Calandra now
demands absolute exclusion. This Comment addresses each side
of the balance and shows that blanket exclusion is not justified.
1. Exclusion of the evidence would pose a substantial cost to
the sentencing proceedings, even under the Guidelines.
Some observers have argued that the Guidelines changed the
role of the sentencing judge by "now preclud[ing] the judge from
looking at the whole picture,"1 thus limiting his view to a few
specific factors." 4 These observers have argued that because
the judge both at trial and at sentencing examines only elements
of the crime rather than elements of character, no additional cost
of excluding evidence at sentencing exists beyond the cost of excluding evidence at trial.1 This argument hinges on the assumption that, under the Guidelines, the sentencing judge is no
longer expected to examine conduct other than that defining the
crime."'
It would be wrong, however, to view the Guidelines as a
shackle on the judge's ability to individualize sentences. The

10 United States v Calandra,414 US 338, 348 (1974).
III See, for example, United States v Vandemark, 522 F2d 1019, 1021-22 (9th Cir

1975).
11

See Jewel, 947 F2d at 238 (Easterbrook concurring) (stating that no court since

Verdugo had excluded illegally seized evidence at sentencing).
113 Comment, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1231 (cited in note 14).
114

Id at 1232.

115 Id.
11 See id at 1230-1232. See also Note, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev at 276-279 (cited in note
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Guidelines evidence a concern for ad hoc differences between
"sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by
similar offenders."117 Such a policy does not necessarily remove
the power of judges to decide which offenses and offenders are
similar. The Guidelines' relevant conduct provision and Section
3661 of the Act support the idea that judges can individualize
sentences by looking outside the elements of the specific crime
charged to formulate sentences according to both the crime and
the criminal.
First, the Guidelines' relevant conduct provision supports the
use of relevant information not included in the charge, as long as
the information is "part of the same ... common scheme or plan

as the offense of conviction.""' The Guidelines' Commentary
indicates that courts should read "common scheme or plan"
broadly;119 in particular, it provides that, in a series of distinct
drug sales, the judge should aggregate the total amounts involved to determine the sentence for conviction on just one of the
sales.1 20 Indeed, even if the defendant is convicted of only one
sale and acquitted of several others, the amounts included in the
acquitted charges should be added into the sentence through the
relevant conduct provision. 1 '
Thus the Guidelines did not adopt a pure "charge offense"
system, which would examine "the conduct that constitutes the
elements of the offense with which the defendant was charged
and of which he was convicted." 22 Instead, a sentencing judge
continues to scrutinize conduct that was not charged in the crime
of conviction. Exclusion of evidence at sentencing, therefore,
would impose a cost above that of exclusion at trial; it would

117

USSG Ch 1, Pt A (cited in note 10).

l

Id at § 1B1.3(a)(2).

See id at § 1B1.3, comment.
The Commentary states:
[Wlhere the defendant engaged in three drug sales of 10, 15, and 20 grams of
cocaine, as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, subsection (a)(2) provides that the total quantity of cocaine involved (45 grams) is to
be used to determine the offense level even if the defendant is convicted of a
single count charging only one of the sales.
USSG § 1B1.3, comment (n 3) (cited in note 10). The Guidelines give another example:
"[I1n a pattern of small thefts... it is important to take into account the full range of
related conduct." Id at § 1B1.3, comment (background).
2' The Commentary states: "Relying on the entire range of conduct, regardless of the
number of counts that are alleged or on which a conviction is obtained appears to be the
most reasonable approach to writing workable guidelines for these offenses." Id.
" See id at Ch 1, Pt A.
"'

'
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prevent the judge from considering relevant conduct evidence not
at issue during the trial on the merits.
Additionally, Section 3661 prohibits any "limitation... on
the information concerning the background, character, and conduct" of the defendant that a sentencing judge may "receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence";12 3 Section 1B1.4 of the Guidelines contains the same
requirement. 12 4 Commentators and judges arguing in favor of
blanket application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing based
on changes wrought by the Guidelines system should not ignore
such a5 strong statement of congressional intent to the con12
trary.
One response to this argument is that Congress cannot mandate the outcome of a constitutional question. Certainly, if the
Fourth Amendment requires application of the exclusionary 26rule
at sentencing, then Congress cannot prevent its application.
However, the majority of courts have not argued that Congress has mandated a particular outcome. Instead, they have
suggested that the outcome of the constitutional Calandra balance is determined by its two inputs-the cost to the system and
the ability to deter.2 7 In turn, these determinations depend
upon the type of sentencing system used. The courts have suggested that Congress did not change the cost side of the equation
under the Guidelines because the Guidelines
maintain a system
12
that values evidence of relevant conduct. 1
Thus, Section 3661's requirement that judges consider a wide
range of evidence has a place in such a system. The Guidelines
merely set forth certain factors-such as relevant conduct-that
judges must include in computing a base offense level; they do
not consider how the government obtains the evidence supporting
those factors.

1'2

18 USC § 3661.

USSG § 1B1.4 (cited in note 10).
" See Comment, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1218-19 (cited in note 14) (arguing, in effect, that
the Guidelines system can trump statutory language, but not attempting to reconcile the
Guidelines with the statutory language); Note, 34 Wm & Mary L Rev at 275-76 (cited in
note 14) (offering the same argument).
"' See Comment, 59 U Chi L Rev at 1233-34 (cited in note 14). See also Jewel, 947
F2d at 238 (Easterbrook concurring) (posing the dilemma).
'2 See United States v Tejada, 956 F2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir 1991), cert denied, 113 S
Ct 124 (1992) and as Cabrerav United States, 113 S Ct 334 (1992); United States v Lynch,
934 F2d 1226, 1235-36 (11th Cir 1991).
'82 Tejada, 956 F2d at 1262; Lynch, 934 F2d at 1235-36.
'24
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2. Application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing will
supply some deterrence, but the need for deterrence does not
justify blanket application.
A second and more compelling argument for exclusion focuses on the deterrence side of the Calandra equation. This argument, adopted by the Nichols court and by Judges Silberman and
Easterbrook, contends that after the Guidelines, officers are no
longer deterred from conducting illegal searches for sentencing
because they know that courts will admit the evidence and enter
it into the sentencing formula.129 Under this line of reasoning,
officers do not worry if courts exclude the bulk of their evidence
at trial because they know that they can obtain large sentences
for a conviction on the smallest sample of evidence.130
The proponents of this argument have contrasted this state
of affairs with the pre-Guidelines scheme under which a sentencing judge was free to consider evidence at his discretion and give
it whatever weight he chose-indeed, even no weight at all. 3'
Under this system, an officer was faced with two options: he
could either ensure that his search was legal so that the proceeds
could support a second conviction which carried certain punishment, or he could risk an illegal search whose proceeds the sentencing judge might choose to ignore. 3 ' Faced with these choices, an officer most likely would not have risked losing a second
conviction by seizing additional evidence illegally.'3 3 Because
the Guidelines do not similarly deter officers from seizing illegal
evidence, some have argued that exclusion is necessary to provide
adequate deterrence under the Guidelines system.
Even if this argument is accurate in principle, it does not
mandate blanket application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing. The Supreme Court has determined that the exclusionary
rule should be narrowly drawn," applying only if the additional deterrence the rule provides outweighs the costs of exclusion.135 Blanket application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing would not be narrowly drawn because it would encompass in-

9 McCrory, 930 F2d at 71 (Silberman concurring); Jewel, 947 F2d at 239
(Easterbrook concurring); United States v Nichols, 979 F2d 402, 411 (6th Cir 1992), affd
on other grounds, 114 S Ct 1921 (1994).
" McCrory, 930 F2d at 71 (Silberman concurring); Jewel, 947 F2d at 239-40
(Easterbrook concurring); Nichols, 979 F2d at 411.
"' McCrory, 930 F2d at 71 (Silberman concurring). See also Nichols, 979 F2d at 411.
.32See McCrory, 930 F2d at 71 (Silberman concurring); Nichols, 979 F2d at 411.
'
McCrory, 930 F2d at 71 (Silberman concurring); Nichols, 979 F2d at 411.
'
See Calandra,414 US at 348.
See id at 347-48.
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stances where the costs of exclusion would outweigh any deterrence. The next subsection of this Comment attempts to prove
the overbreadth of this blanket rule by examining the facts of
two of the previously discussed cases to see how courts could
more closely tailor the rule while still deterring illegal searches.
B.

An Evidentiary Limitation Would Satisfy the Purposes of the
Exclusionary Rule

Consider two paradigm scenarios, based roughly on the facts
of actual cases, in which police illegally seized evidence that the
trial judge excluded and that the prosecution then sought to introduce at sentencing:
(a) Tejada: Police buy two kilograms of cocaine from the
defendant on the street and immediately arrest him.
Following the arrest, officers go to the defendant's unoccupied apartment, use a battering ram to enter without
a warrant, and find cocaine and a weapon.13
(b) Lynch: Officers undertake a major drug investigation. Before they complete a transaction, they arrest the
defendant because they fear he will flee or harm others.
When they enter his home without a warrant to arrest
him, they seize two guns in plain view on the dining ta137
ble.
The exclusionary rule would provide vastly different levels of
deterrence in these two cases. In Tejada, the illegal search was
imminently deterrable. The officers had already bought two kilograms of cocaine from the defendant, an amount sufficient to
send him to prison for several years.138 If the exclusionary rule
had prohibited consideration at sentencing of the evidence seized
from the apartment, reasonable officers would likely have waited
until they obtained a warrant to search the house, ensuring that
the evidence would be admissible in the case-in-chief and would
result in a successful second conviction.
The fears of the current approach's critics are justified here.
Because the exclusionary rule does not currently exclude this
evidence at sentencing, officers can perform the search confident

"' Tejada, 956 F2d at 1258-59.

...Lynch, 934 F2d at 1228-29.
1..

See USSG Ch 5, Pt A (cited in note 10). Two kilograms of cocaine carry a base

offense level of 28. Id at § 2D1.1(c)(8). This offense level carries a prison term of at least
78 months. Id at Ch 5, Pt A.
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that the evidence will be considered as relevant conduct during
sentencing on a conviction for the sale. Therefore, the officers can
accurately predict the dramatic increase in sentence severity that
will occur due to the seizure.
In Lynch, however, the officers felt that they needed to arrest
the defendant immediately to avoid flight or danger. They chose
this course of action despite the lack of physical evidence to support their accusations. By bursting into the defendant's home,
they risked having all physical evidence they found excluded at
trial.139 Because it is unlikely that the police would have been
deterred from arresting the defendants if they had known that
these guns would not have been admitted at sentencing, the
exclusionary rule should not apply here.
Thus, because the level of deterrence achieved in these two
cases differs greatly, the exclusionary rule should apply in Tejada
but not in Lynch. The courts, however, must find a principled
way to distinguish between these two scenarios. This Comment
argues that the best way to distinguish between these situations
is through an "evidentiary" limitation, suggested in Verdugo,
which would exclude evidence acquired in illegal searches only if
the officers already have secured "sufficient evidence to convict"
the defendant of a related offense.14 ° Such a limitation would
provide, by reference to objective criteria, the deterrence against
illegal seizure of evidence that commentators fear is now lacking
in the post-Guidelines world.14' Such a limitation would best
approximate, in an objective manner, those cases in which "substantial incentives" exist for illegal searches.' This test would
' The defendants in Lynch were convicted on the basis of drugs and a weapon uncovered in a search performed later pursuant to a warrant. Lynch, 934 F2d at 1229.
140 United States v Verdugo, 402 F2d 599, 612 (9th Cir 1968). While police may not

know in every case exactly how much drugs they have legally seized or whether the quantity seized is sufficient to gain a conviction, they surely will have a sense of it in most
cases. Moreover, because a constitutional right is at issue, we may prefer a rule making
officers wary of illegal searches after they have any physical evidence.
14 In Jewel, Judge Easterbrook stressed the need for a categorical rule. He believed
that objectivity should be attained by a categorical application of the exclusionary rule
during the entire sentencing phase-the distinct "juncture of litigation." He did not fully
explore the possibility that courts could attain a measure of objectivity without a blanket
rule, even though he noted that Leon was an example of such an objective rule at the trial
stage. See Jewel, 947 F2d at 239 (Easterbrook concurring), citing United States v Leon,
468 US 897, 922-23 (1984) (holding that evidence seized under a technically invalid warrant is admissible unless the warrant was so obviously invalid that the officer's reliance
on it was objectively unreasonable).
S4' See Verdugo, 402 F2d at 613. An "evidentiary" rule would allay the root concern of
the growing body of dissenters. Judge Silberman was especially concerned in McCrory
because "the prosecution ha[d] more than enough evidence to convict the defendant on a
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not only deter searches but would also be relatively easy to administer: judges would only need to examine the amount of physical evidence the officers had in hand at the time of the search in
question to determine whether the illegally seized evidence
should be excluded.
A properly applied "evidentiary" limitation would exclude
illegally seized evidence in many of the cases that are most troublesome and in which the searches seem most
deterrable-Verdugo, Tejada, and possibly McCrory. In Verdugo,
the classic example, the illegally seized evidence would unquestionably have been excluded because a warrantless search continued for four and one-half hours after officers made the initial
arrest. "3 Likewise, the illegally seized evidence would have
been inadmissible in Tejada, where the government conducted a
second search after it already had bought two kilograms of cocaine from the defendant."" Because the court could have con-

victed the defendant of this offense, the fruits of the later search
would have been inadmissible. In McCrory, the government had
already bought fifty dollars worth of crack, enough for a conviction, from the defendant; "5 thus, the later search would have
been inadmissible if the search were illegal. "6
This proposed "evidentiary" exception would not upset the
Calandra balance by admitting evidence from searches that are
not cheaply deterred. In other cases such as Lynch, Vandemark,

lesser charge before they conduct[ed] the illegal search." McCrory, 930 F2d at 71
(Silberman concurring). Judge Easterbrook complained that the purpose test of
Vandemark and Schipani destroyed Verdugo; no defendant since has been able to exclude
illegally seized evidence at sentencing. See Jewel, 947 F2d at 238 (Easterbrook concurring). Commentators have also worried about this problem. See, for example, Comment,
59 U Chi L Rev at 1237 (cited in note 14). The "evidentiary" limitation would restore
Verdugo's full strength and would apply it in exactly the type of case that concerned
Judge Silberman.
"
'"

Verdugo, 402 F2d at 610.
Tejada, 956 F2d at 1259.

"'
In McCrory, undercover officers saw bags of crack in an apartment while the defendant was selling the officers $50 worth of crack. McCrory, 930 F2d at 64-65. After the
officers confirmed that the substance was cocaine, a team entered the apartment without
a warrant and arrested McCrory. A later search, for which the government had a warrant, revealed a large cache of weapons, drug paraphernalia, and a kilogram and a half of
crack. Id at 65. While the government agreed not to introduce the hoard of contraband
found in this search at trial, it requested that the judge consider it as evidence of "relevant conduct" at sentencing. Id at 65-66. The corresponding increase in the base offense
level multiplied McCrory's sentence approximately 900 percent. See id at 66.
'4' McCrory, 930 F2d at 64-65. The officers possessed a warrant for this search; however, the defendant still contested its legality because the officers had entered the apartment earlier without a warrant in order to arrest the defendant. Id at 65.
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and possibly Torres, the evidence would remain admissible at
sentencing. In Lynch, the evidence would have been admissible
because the government had no physical evidence to use against
the defendant before a search incidental to his arrest. 147 In
Vandemark, border patrol agents, unaware that Vandemark was
already on probation for possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute, found 284 pounds of marijuana in his trunk during a
routine search.'48 The government declined to prosecute
Vandemark for the second offense because he protested the reasonableness of the search. 149 The prosecution, however, used the
evidence to persuade a judge to revoke Vandemark's probation
and impose a two-year sentence for the first crime. 5 ' The "evidentiary" limitation would not have excluded the evidence from
the border patrol search. The agents were searching only for
evidence of an initial crime when they looked into Vandemark's
trunk; 5 ' they did not know that prior evidence existed supporting a sentence for drug possession.
Some courts have not asked the right questions to determine
whether the seizure would meet the "evidentiary" limitation. In
Torres, for example, the police simultaneously searched an apartment and a car." 2 The court did not recount whether the police
found drugs first in the apartment, which they had a warrant to
search, or in the car, which they did not have a warrant to
search.'53 The court also failed to state whether the owners of
the car were the residents of the apartment, or whether the officers knew these facts at the time.'54 These inquiries would have
been crucial to determining whether the officers illegally seized
drugs after they already had sufficient physical evidence to convict the defendants.
While Schipani's "purpose" limitation has carried the day as
the only potential application of the exclusionary rule at sentencing,'55 it does not best serve the goal of deterrence. The "purpose" exception only excludes evidence where the defendant can
show that the officers conducting the search had a subjective

"'

See Lynch, 934 F2d at 1228-29.

See Vandemark, 522 F2d at 1020.
149Id.
'"8

150 Id.
's'
152

'8

See id.

United States v Torres, 926 F2d 321, 322 (3d Cir 1991).
See id.
See id.
See, for example, McCrory, 930 F2d at 69; Tejada, 956 F2d at 1263.
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intent to increase the defendant's sentence. Even in the most
egregious cases, the courts have found no such purpose, 56 demonstrating that the current approach neither protects defendants
nor deters illegal searches.
CONCLUSION
The current mechanical Guidelines system, in which officers
can accurately predict the effect that illegally seized evidence will
have on the defendants' sentences, insufficiently deters illegal
seizures. Categorically applying the exclusionary rule at sentencing to deter illegal searches, however, is too extreme of a solution. Instituting a Verdugo-like "evidentiary" limitation would
allow the exclusionary rule to act as a deterrent where deterrence would be effective-where the police already possess sufficient legally seized evidence to convict the defendant of a related
offense but continue to conduct a search in order to enhance the
sentence.

"

See Tejada, 956 F2d at 1263.

